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In loco intellegentia: human factors for the future European train driver 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) represents a step change in 
technology for rail operations in Europe.  It comprises track-to-train communications 
and intelligent on-board systems providing an unprecedented degree of support to the 
train driver.  ERTMS is designed to improve safety, capacity and performance, as well 
as facilitating interoperability across the European rail network.  In many ways, 
particularly from the human factors perspective, ERTMS has parallels with automation 
concepts in the aviation and automotive industries.  Lessons learned from both these 
industries are that such technology raises a number of human factors issues associated 
with train driving and operations.  The interaction amongst intelligent agents throughout 
the system must be effectively coordinated to ensure that the strategic benefits of 
ERTMS are realised.  The present paper discusses the psychology behind some of these 
key issues, such as mental workload, interface design, user information requirements, 
transitions and migration, and communications.  Relevant experience in aviation and 
vehicle automation is drawn upon to give an overview of the human factors challenges 
facing the UK rail industry in implementing ERTMS technology.  By anticipating and 
defining these challenges before the technology is implemented, it is hoped that a 
proactive and structured programme of research can be planned to meet them. 
 
KEYWORDS: train driving, automation, mental workload, interface design, 
communications 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The first few decades of the 21st century are set to see a technological revolution in 
European rail travel (RSSB, 2005).  With the Channel Tunnel in place between England 
and France, and frequent international traffic across continental Europe, there has 
emerged a need to harmonise operations between the member countries (RSSB, 2005).  
At the heart of this principle sits a brand new technology – the European Rail Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS). 
ERTMS will provide a unified approach to train control, signalling and 
communications, in order to achieve greater mobility for trains across the European rail 
network.  In addition to interoperability, the system will provide improved safety with 
automatic train protection, and increased capacity by better management of traffic.  
Needless to say, though, such a radical change in operations will have a significant 
impact on the human elements of the system, and there is currently considerable effort 
to address the human factors issues of ERTMS at an early stage in its development. 
Today’s train drivers perform fundamentally the same set of tasks as those of the first 
steam locomotives.  Although the traction technology has changed, and specific rules 
and procedures have evolved over time, the traditional driving task consists of 
monitoring lineside signals and controlling the speed of the train in accordance with the 
movement authority that those signals provide.  The signalling system is designed to 
maintain separation between trains by keeping at least one ‘block’ (i.e., section of track 
between two signals) free from one train to the next.  Signallers, typically in centralised 
control rooms these days, monitor increasingly automated route settings and adjust 
signals and points to facilitate the safe and expeditious movement of traffic.  The whole 
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system can be represented by a network of mostly human team members working 
together to achieve an objective (cf. Walker et al., this issue). 
ERTMS is a step change in that system, adding a level of technological intelligence 
never before seen on the railways.  Currently, the most visible aspect of the system is in 
the driver’s cab, as the driver-machine interface (DMI) presents movement authority 
and other routing information which has traditionally been displayed on the lineside (see 
CENELEC, 2000).  Such an enhanced level of information means that ultimately we 
will no longer need lineside signals, and they will be removed.  This single innovation 
alone will have purported benefits of improved driver situation awareness, increased 
efficiency in train control (i.e., optimising the timetable while maintaining safe stopping 
distances), and increased trackside safety (via a reduced need for trackside maintenance 
activities). 
However, human factors experience in other domains suggests that there may be 
shortfalls in these expected benefits (e.g., Stanton and Marsden, 1996).  The DMI 
consists of a single VDU touchscreen, although key data (such as speed) are also 
presented on redundant analogue dials.  As such, the introduction of ERTMS will have a 
similar impact on the train driver as the glass cockpit concept has had on aircraft pilots, 
or as in-vehicle information systems (such as navigation displays) have had on car 
drivers.  What the driver needs to know, and how that information is presented, are 
crucial questions in avoiding the possibility of driver distraction.  Furthermore, the 
increased use of automatic protection systems is beginning to mirror the level of 
automation in aircraft and, more recently, in cars (see Walker, Stanton and Young, 
2001, for a discussion on the technology trajectory of vehicle automation).  Indeed, the 
concept of automated separation is akin to Automatic Intelligent Cruise Control in cars, 
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which can compensate for (lack of) human expertise – but it can also have its own 
problems, such as how to maintain driver attention and awareness of what the system is 
doing (e.g., Stanton and Young, this issue; Young and Stanton, 2004).  Consequently, 
whilst the actual applications may appear relatively diverse, many of the underlying 
human factors issues addressed in these other transport domains will be applicable to 
future European rail operations. 
Thus we see the potential problems facing the train driver, particularly in the UK (as 
we shall see later), include mental workload, situation awareness, interface design, 
transitions and migration to ERTMS, dependence on lineside information, as well as 
communications with other agents in the system (i.e., signallers).  Previous work has 
drawn many of these concepts together to propose a psychological model of car driving 
with automation (Stanton and Young, 2000a); the present paper lays some of the 
groundwork for a similar effort in train driving.  We discuss the main human factors 
concerns and summarise the psychological research behind them.  Relevant research 
from the aviation and automotive domains is drawn upon in an effort to transfer lessons 
learned to the rail industry.  Many of the issues have already been discussed elsewhere, 
but not specifically applied to railway operations.  Common problems, which transcend 
the boundaries of the actual transport domain, are prevalent in human factors, and these 
are brought out in the present paper.  Ultimately, this paper describes the foundation for 
a proactive series of studies (which is already underway in the UK rail industry) 
intended to address these problems before the technology is implemented – an idealistic 
opportunity which rarely exists in human factors.  Firstly, though, some background to 
ERTMS technology itself is provided. 
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WHAT IS ERTMS? 
 
There are three main components to the ERTMS technology: the European Train 
Control System (ETCS), the European Traffic Management Layer (ETML), and the 
Global System for Mobile communications – Railway (GSM-R). 
The ETCS element is the primary control system onboard the train.  Its most visible 
aspect is the DMI, which displays a wealth of information about train movement, 
including speed (and speed restrictions), movement authority, and route planning 
information (such as gradients, neutral sections, tunnels etc.).  Behind this interface, 
though, the system incorporates automatic train protection (ATP), which calculates 
braking curves and intervenes with a brake application if the driver is on course to 
exceed a speed limit or movement authority.  In theory, when ETCS is fully enabled, it 
should be impossible to pass a signal at danger.  Various indications on the DMI 
continuously inform the driver about these limits, such that s/he can control the train 
appropriately.  Figure 1 is a sample screenshot showing these indications; in particular 
note the speed limit and movement authority bar around the speedometer, as well as the 
planning display on the right, giving route information on an exponential scale up to 
four kilometers in advance.  Further information on the DMI can be found in the 
European Standard document (CENELEC, 2000). 
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Figure 1 
Sample screenshot of the ETCS DMI 
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The signalling system is covered by ETML, and at the time of writing, it is probably fair 
to say that this is the least developed aspect of ERTMS.  Whilst the technology is well 
developed, and most signalling schemes already in place, from the human factors point 
of view there has been relatively little progress on ERTMS signaller interfaces for the 
control room.  Most of the effort so far has been biased towards the driver and ETCS, 
although there is also a clear opportunity to optimise signalling centres.  Similar issues 
of workload and interface design abound for signallers, and the introduction of ETML 
technology should be used as a motivator to address these. 
Finally, GSM-R is the communications network that holds it all together.  This works 
in exactly the same way as public mobile (cellular) telephones, but on a dedicated and 
exclusive network for the railway.  As such, it provides enhanced voice communications 
when compared with previous radio systems, as well as being the bearer for data 
transmissions in higher levels of ERTMS (see below).  More technical information can 
be found in the EIRENE specifications (2000; 2001), which mandate the functional and 
system requirements for GSM-R. 
The ERTMS concept is split into three levels.  Level 1 is essentially an advanced 
implementation of ATP, with trackside ‘balises’ (essentially telemetric equipment) 
providing the train with information about signal aspects on the road ahead.  Level 2 
maintains a fixed block system for signalling, but the data are now transmitted 
continuously via GSM-R instead of using the balises.  Level 2 can either be overlaid 
onto existing lineside signals, or the lineside infrastructure can be removed, with the 
driver relying purely on the DMI for conveying speed and movement authority.  Finally, 
Level 3 does away with fixed block signalling altogether, since the train supplies 
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accurate and continuous position data to the control centre.  With Level 3 in place, train 
separation can be maintained on a ‘moving block’ principle. 
It could be argued that, as we step through these levels, we are imparting increasing 
intelligence to the technological system – and increasing capability to assume control in 
an emergency.  How this then integrates with the existing intelligent agents in the 
network – the drivers and signallers – is a question of human factors. 
 
 
THE HUMAN FACTOR 
 
Possibly more than any other European country, in the UK the advent of ERTMS 
represents a significant change in industry culture for train operations.  Whilst the UK 
has maintained a route-based signalling philosophy (signals convey information about 
the ‘occupancy’ of the route ahead – the driver uses signs and route knowledge to 
decide on the appropriate speed), continental Europe has adopted speed-signalling 
(signals convey information to the driver about what speed is appropriate, not the state 
of the route ahead) – which is more compatible with ERTMS operation.  Needless to 
say, the impact of this change for UK drivers should not be underestimated, since their 
basic task and knowledge requirements (such as the dependence on route knowledge) 
will be fundamentally altered.  Some of the key issues include mental workload, 
interface design, driver information needs, transitions to and from ERTMS modes, and 
communications.  These will now be dealt with in turn. 
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Mental workload 
 
The introduction of any new technology into a system can raise concerns about mental 
workload (MWL).  On the one hand, operating the new system could lead to overload, 
while the potential for increased automation can just as easily result in underload (e.g., 
Parasuraman, Mouloua, Molloy and Hilburn, 1996).  ERTMS, with its complex 
information displays and capacity for automatic train protection, may well cause both 
problems for UK drivers if its implementation is not handled carefully.  In many ways, 
MWL is a fundamental theme in applied research of this nature, since it can influence 
and be affected by a host of other design and performance factors.  As such, it deserves 
particular attention. 
Extremes of MWL can create conditions of overload or underload, which may both 
be detrimental to performance (Wilson and Rajan, 1995).  The notion of an optimal 
level of MWL is based on attentional resource theory, whereby overload or underload 
can each cause psychological strain due to a mismatch between demands and 
capabilities (Byrne and Parasuraman, 1996).  It is becoming accepted that optimal 
performance will be the reward for optimised demands (Hancock and Caird, 1993). 
Overload occurs if the demands of a task are beyond the limited attentional capacity 
of the operator.  This can be worsened if the operator becomes stressed, as stress is itself 
resource demanding and can compound cognitive interference (Matthews and Desmond, 
1995).  Conversely, those susceptible to stress or fatigue may find their performance to 
be worse in conditions of underload, as there is a failure to mobilise compensatory 
effort appropriately to cope with the demands (Desmond, Hancock and Monette, 1998).  
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Underload has also been associated with passivity, with optimal MWL reflecting a need 
to exercise a level of control (Hockey, Briner, Tatersall and Wiethoff, 1989). 
It may seem like a contradiction, but automated systems can both reduce and 
increase MWL.  For instance, it has been observed (Hughes and Dornheim, 1995) that 
glass cockpits in commercial aircraft have relieved workload in areas such as reduced 
display clutter, and more automated flight procedures.  However, the same cockpit 
systems have increased workload in other areas, such as increased decision options or 
confusion as to the operating mode (Hilburn, 1997), and increased vigilance demands 
(Hancock and Verwey, 1997).  This can lead to mental underload during highly 
automated activities such as cruise flight, but mental overload during more critical 
operations such as take-off and landing (Parasuraman et al., 1996).  Others have 
predicted that future systems could increase complexity or excessively reduce demands 
in both aircraft and cars (Labiale, 1997; Lovesey, 1995; Verwey, 1993).  Both mental 
overload and mental underload are therefore very real possibilities, and are equally 
serious conditions which can lead to performance decrements, attentional lapses, and 
errors (Wilson and Rajan, 1995).  Young and Stanton (2001) reported a study on the 
effects of automation on driver underload, finding that drivers were less able to resume 
manual control in the event of automation failure.  They further implied that automated 
safety systems on trains might similarly increase the chances of certain types of driver 
error. 
Under some circumstances, MWL can be both increased and decreased by the same 
automated system, depending on the measurement method.  A study using a low-fidelity 
flight simulator found that the autopilot lowered subjective MWL responses, but 
apparently increased MWL on a secondary task measure (Thornton et al., 1992).  
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Skilled pilots were used in this experiment, so the dissociation may reflect a subjective 
sensitivity to automation, and the effect of automaticity on the secondary task, which 
has been discussed previously (Liu and Wickens, 1994). 
Although automation is usually implemented with the intention of reducing 
workload, current evidence suggests that this intention is not necessarily well-founded.  
Automation can be a useful assistance device in high MWL situations.  But if the task 
MWL is already low, then automation only removes the operator from the control loop 
and can be detrimental to performance (Ephrath and Young, 1981).  Being relieved of 
the task may reduce MWL, but this by no means offsets the value of being in active 
control (Kessel and Wickens, 1982). 
Thus we see many authors are concerned about how automated controllers can lead 
to underload; as well as how the complexity of new systems is outpacing human 
information processing abilities, and inevitably results in overload (Lovesey, 1995; 
Wiener and Curry, 1980). Technological interventions can take any form from full 
operational control, to simple decision support or task assistance (Kaber and Endsley, 
1997; Labiale, 1997).  This is illustrated by the positions of two major aircraft 
manufacturers, who have ventured further into automated territory in recent years.  
Airbus use a ‘hard protection’ system in their A320 and A340 series, employing 
automation to prevent error, and hence it can override the pilot.  Boeing, on the other 
hand, opted for ‘soft protection’ in their 777 aircraft, using automation as a tool to aid 
pilots, and not giving it the authority to override pilot control (Hughes and Dornheim, 
1995). 
Wiener and Curry (1980) believe that automation has already passed its optimal 
point.  The assumption that automation will eliminate human error is flawed - for social 
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and political reasons, humans will always be involved with the system (passengers are 
largely reluctant to board an aircraft without a pilot).  In more than three decades of 
automated systems, the human element remains to provide flexibility and reliability in 
automated systems, to monitor the environment and take over in the event of failure (see 
Young, 1969, for one of the earliest benchmarks of this point).  Automated systems are 
not error-free and, when automation errors occur, they can be more serious than manual 
errors due to the operator’s impaired ability to cope (cf. Endsley and Kiris, 1995).  At 
best, automation errors go unnoticed; at worst, they are compounded by human errors. 
 
Interface design 
 
The European standard for the ETCS DMI (CENELEC, 2000) mandates a certain level 
of functionality to be included in every country’s implementation.  In addition, there are 
a number of optional elements that can also be included at the discretion or 
requirements of each member state.  There is thus a clear opportunity to optimise the 
interface for the specific needs of the UK driving population. 
Part of the mandatory specification divides the screen into six areas for providing 
information to the driver.  One of these areas is known as the ‘planning area’, which 
provides the driver with advance warning of permitted speed limits, movement 
authorities and other information on the track ahead (see the right-hand portion of the 
screen in figure 1).  Within the UK, there is a need to determine whether and how such 
planning information might be used to help the driver to control the train safely, reliably 
and productively.  Where it is identified that the information would support the driver, 
there is a requirement to specify the nature and format for its presentation. 
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Research on interface design popularly suggests that the system image should be 
matched to the user’s mental model or internal representation of the task or device (e.g., 
Kantowitz and Campbell, 1996; Norman, 1988; Stanton and Young, 2000b).  Keeping 
device behaviour consistent with the operator’s expectations can therefore enhance 
perceptions of the system and its state.  For instance, when pilots are adjusting altitude, 
they tend to use a constant rate of ascent (or descent) for the bulk of the change, but 
when they are approaching the target altitude they slow the rate to ease into the target 
altitude with no oscillations.  Automated altitude capture, though, in some cases uses a 
constant rate throughout the change, levelling off almost instantly at the target altitude.  
This has led some pilots to believe the system was going to overshoot the intended 
altitude, and they have subsequently intervened (Hughes and Dornheim, 1995). 
Recently, an alternative perspective has surfaced which challenges this cognitive 
compatibility principle.  Vicente (1997) argues that the design should not centre around 
the user’s model, as this may not be accurate (Kempton, 1986, gives a clear example of 
how mental models may be useful for everyday activities, even though they may be 
quite inaccurate).  Rather, the design of the interface should be so transparent as to 
facilitate the development of an accurate model in the user. 
In the context of UK train driving, there are essentially two types of mental model 
that need to be supported – one is the representation of the train dynamics, while the 
other is the model of the route itself.  Both are crucial to effective control of the train, 
and both are currently highly skilled elements of drivers’ expertise.  In addition, the 
driver has considerable operational pressures to meet the timetable, resulting in a very 
small envelope of performance in order to maintain safe and on-time running.  Whilst 
the enhanced (and to some extent integrated) information on the ERTMS DMI is 
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probably an improvement on current displays, it does not directly help the driver 
optimise the many constraints placed on them (i.e., timetable, speed restrictions, 
signalling, stopping distance of train, etc.).  At any single point in time, the drivers 
chosen speed could be in one of three states: too slow (failing the timetable constraint), 
just right (satisfying the timetable, line speed, signalling and stopping constraints), or 
too fast (failing the maximum line speed constraint and/or signalling and stopping 
constraints).  Thus an ‘ideal’ display might seek to integrate and impart these constraints 
rather than just report the status of individual variables.  This is the essence of Vicente’s 
work – helping the operator to optimise the system constraints in order to produce the 
best outcome.  Research is required to address how the additional information on the 
DMI will either support or disrupt this knowledge that the driver maintains.  By 
implication, the consequences will either be to adapt the design of the interface to foster 
such mental models, or radically change UK driving practice to suit the system.  
Naturally, the optimal human factors solution would be to adapt the interface. 
Indeed, there are a number of specific issues facing the industry today that could be 
solved with intelligent design of the DMI.  Controlling train speeds on the approach to 
diverging junctions has always been difficult with route-based signalling, since there are 
few cost-effective ways of separating the speed information from the movement 
authority.  As a consequence, signals beyond junctions are often SPAD ‘hotspots’.  
Exploiting the planning area to provide advance information about diverging routes 
could help drivers to develop more effective driving strategies.  Similarly, existing train 
protection and warning systems have been known to cause problems to drivers due to 
poor interface design – sometimes resulting in their being overridden inappropriately.  
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The new ETCS interface provides the opportunity to integrate these systems on a single 
display. 
 
Information requirements 
 
Up until the implementation of ERTMS Level 2 (without lineside signals), drivers will 
be faced with two different sources of information about train movements – the DMI, 
and the traditional external information (lineside signs and signals etc.).  Most of the 
time, these sources should convey consistent instructions to the driver.  However, there 
may be times when the two are in conflict.  A prime example is in the most basic form 
of Level 1, with one balise for each lineside signal.  If a driver had passed a signal 
showing a restrictive aspect, the ETCS would calculate a braking curve to stop at the 
next appropriate signal.  Now, if the approach to that signal gave very clear sighting, the 
driver might observe the signal ‘step up’ from danger to a less restrictive aspect, while 
ETCS would not update with this new information until it had passed the relevant 
balise.  There may be a short period, then, when the lineside signal displays ‘proceed’ 
while ETCS says ‘stop’.  (N.B. A more advanced version of Level 1 uses ‘infill balises’ 
between signals to help overcome this problem – although this is less than ideal from 
the human factors perspective, representing as it does the ‘sticking plaster’ approach.)  
Avoiding mixed messages like these is crucial to maintaining driver situation awareness 
(Endsley, 1995) and performance.  Indeed, there are already many examples in current 
railway operations where disparate systems apparently contradict each other in their 
feedback to the driver.  For instance, the Automatic Warning System (AWS) was 
designed to alert drivers that they are approaching a cautionary (i.e., not green) signal.  
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However, this means that the driver receives a warning even when the appropriate 
response is to proceed (albeit more slowly).  At the same time, repeater signals on the 
lineside, which give abbreviated information about upcoming signals, only distinguish 
between signals at danger (i.e., red) or otherwise – essentially the opposite criterion 
from AWS.  Furthermore, AWS has since been extended to cover speed restrictions, so 
the driver also receives the same warnings in many places where there are no signals 
nearby.  On top of all that, there are myriad other safety systems in the cab (Train 
Protection and Warning Systems, Driver’s Reminder Appliances etc.) all working 
independently and sending separate streams of information to the driver.  ERTMS 
provides a real opportunity to integrate these systems and send a single, unified stream 
of information. 
Since many UK ERTMS routes will also be used by conventional stock for some 
time, the competition for the driver’s attention between the lineside, the DMI, and 
existing train systems means that research is needed to address potential problems of 
confusion, distraction, and situation awareness.  The relative demands of head-up versus 
head-down processing are probably more aligned with car driving than flying – even 
without lineside signals, train drivers will have to monitor the external environment for 
obstacles, trackside workers etc.  Having said that, the lack of any lateral control 
demands (i.e., steering – a primary source of workload in car driving; Young and 
Stanton, 2002) and the extreme speeds involved (which can preclude any effective 
reactions to observed dangers) suggest that the visual demands of train driving lie 
somewhere on a continuum between automotive and aviation.  So, in this somewhat 
unique visual environment, guidelines should be developed to optimise the design of 
external information sources, as well as helping drivers to cope with changing their 
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dependence to the in-cab interface.  Solutions such as head-up displays could also be 
explored.  Clearly, there will be considerable overlap between this research and the 
previously discussed study on interface design. 
 
Transitions and migration 
 
Fitting ERTMS to the rail network is not going to happen overnight – the economic 
strategy dictates that routes will be fitted in order of priority, and the significant system 
development involved means that this will only take place when major resignalling is 
required (see the final report of the ERTMS Programme Board, issued by Railway 
Safety and the Strategic Rail Authority in 2002, for more information on the 
development strategy).  There will consequently be considerable periods of time when 
various modes of ERTMS will be fitted only to parts of the network.  There are two 
main problems associated with this gradual implementation: one is the general 
migration of drivers to the new system over time, and the other involves transition 
between modes (including non-ERTMS, or ‘Level 0’) during the course of a journey.  
Since it is not planned to fit the entire network with ERTMS, some of these 
geographical transitions will be permanent.  Whilst the concerns of migration and 
transition are related, each has its own set of issues which needs to be addressed 
separately. 
During the early years of ERTMS implementation drivers will have to negotiate 
transitions between fitted and non-fitted routes.  The activities that a driver must carry 
out at such boundaries, or monitor that the ERTMS has successfully achieved, can lead 
to personal peak workloads (RSSB, 2004).  In addition to the system changeover, there 
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will be a change in driving style to manage, particularly with Level 2 (System D) modes 
without line side signals. 
Within ERTMS, transitions from level to level are designed to be handled by the 
system, although driver actions may also be required.  Both system and driver actions 
need to be identified and addressed with regard to ergonomics research on allocation of 
function.  The inherent risks of badly planned transitions include increased mental 
workload, reduced situation awareness, mode errors or mode confusions, and 
inappropriate levels of trust.  The latter two factors are related, since a mode error could 
occur as the driver becomes dependent on the automatic train protection systems (cf. 
Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) – which could have severe consequences on a non-fitted 
section of route. 
One of the most prevalent problems with automation, which has been particularly 
observed in aviation, is mode errors (Stanton and Marsden, 1996).  Woods et al. (1994; 
pp. 6-7) define a mode error as “a device where the same action or indication means 
different things in different contexts (i.e., modes) and a person who loses track of the 
current context”.  The simplest example of a mode error in everyday life is attempting to 
set the time on a digital clock, when the clock is actually in alarm mode.  System 
functionality and flexibility can increase with the introduction of modes (e.g., Sellen, 
Kurtenbach and Buxton, 1992).  Complex, event-driven systems may change modes 
without input from, or feedback to, the operator.  However, this can cause confusion and 
increased cognitive demand as the user tries to keep track of mode transitions and the 
system state (Sarter and Woods, 1995).  Consequently, ‘automation surprises’ may 
occur, in which the system behaves according to specifications, yet this is quite different 
to that which the operator expects or desires (e.g., Palmer, 1995).  Accident reports 
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show that autopilot failures can lead to a loss of control and consequent crash, even 
though the pilot may be capable of controlling the aircraft under such conditions 
(Young, 1969).  Failures lead to initial overcompensation and wild oscillatory 
responses, which may not dampen for around 20 seconds.  Aircraft controls were often 
found hard over in the wrong direction, suggesting that the pilot either did not recognise 
the fault or did not react quickly enough (Young, 1969). 
Excessive trust in automation has been associated with vigilance failures (Molloy 
and Parasuraman, 1996), and trust in automation is an issue which has attracted special 
attention.  Muir (1994) developed a model of trust in machines, based on previous 
models of interpersonal trust.  It was proposed that trust is based on perceptions of 
competence and predictability, such that it can develop over time if there is little 
variability in system behaviour.  The level of trust in an automated system determines 
the human’s use and monitoring of that system, and trust is governed by self-
confidence, confidence in the system, and the reliability of the system (Hancock and 
Parasuraman, 1992).  Lee and Moray (1994) found that automation tends to be used 
when trust in the device exceeds operators’ self-confidence in their own performance at 
the task.  If self-confidence outweighs trust, manual control will prevail. 
Under the systems perspective of ergonomics, the human and machine elements are 
considered as part of the same team, working together towards a common goal.  It is 
therefore possible to draw upon knowledge of human-human cooperation to guide the 
design of automated systems.  The types of automatic protection systems associated 
with ERTMS divide the driving task in a horizontal or parallel manner (cf. Stammers 
and Hallam, 1985).  That is, the overall task of driving is shared between the human and 
the automation.  For instance, the system gathers information about movement 
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authority, calculates a braking curve to comply, and transmits this information via the 
DMI to the driver.  The driver then follows the braking curve by making the appropriate 
actions on the power/brake controller.  This is as opposed to vertical organisation, 
where the task would be divided at according to task levels (e.g., the system fully 
controls speed in accordance with movement authority, while the driver monitors for 
track obstructions etc.).  Such a horizontal model of task allocation fosters teamworking 
and can assist in balancing task demands between team members (where those members 
may be human and/or non-human). 
A key requirement for the safe implementation of ERTMS is that there is a process 
for selecting and planning transitions so that engineering considerations do not 
dominate fitment on any line of route to the detriment of safety and performance.  
Experience in the planning of Eurostar operations, and in the siting of transitions on 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link infrastructure concluded that a systematic approach to 
transition planning is vital to reduce risks.  As track fitment rolls out there is a potential 
for unacceptable transitions to be presented to drivers.  Research is necessary to explore 
and define the human-centred, risk-based principles for planning transitions to be 
applied throughout the UK track fitment stages, both at permanent and temporary 
transition sites to minimise these safety and performance risks. 
 
Communications 
 
Although the previous concerns have been specifically associated with the ETCS, there 
are also driver risks associated with the introduction of the new telecommunications 
system to support ERTMS – GSM-R.  Mobile phones have pervaded everyday life for 
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most of the general public, and whilst their specific use as a train radio system offers 
greatly enhanced functionality, it could also bring increased risks.  Recent research has 
been pointing to the conclusion that mobile phone use in cars is detrimental to 
performance (e.g., Haigney, Taylor and Westerman, 2000), but there is no indication so 
far that these results are transferable to train driving. 
Young and Jenkinson (2003) reviewed the literature as part of ongoing work to 
provide human factors input to the UK Railway Group Standard on GSM-R radio 
systems.  They argued that road research with lorry drivers might be more readily 
applicable to the rail domain.  In general, though, the results from lorry trials mirror 
those found in car driving, and conclude that mobile phone use while driving a road 
vehicle is unacceptably hazardous.  The main distraction effects appear to be on the 
low-level, tactical elements of driving, and the use of a hands-free kit does not seem to 
relieve the situation. 
Alternatively, one might draw upon aviation operations as a parallel to rail, with the 
signaller playing a similar role to the air traffic controller.  Communications protocols 
are similar in each industry (Gibson, Megaw, Young and Lowe, 2005, analysed railway 
communications in the context of similar research in aviation and air traffic control), 
and rail users could perhaps benefit from more experiential training – through which 
aircraft crews develop confidence in their communications technique and command of 
the necessary language.  One of the main observable differences between 
communications in these domains, though, is that the party line system is employed in 
aviation, whilst duplex (i.e., point-to-point) calls are preferred in the rail industry 
(Young and Jenkinson, 2003).  Again, the proven value of aircraft party line (or open 
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channel) communications prompts the question of whether a similar system should be 
introduced for railway operations. 
In addition to the potential issues of radio communication, GSM-R offers enhanced 
functionality for data transmissions, such as text and fax messages.  This trend towards 
multi-modal information displays is similar to the development of digital ‘datalink’ 
technology in aviation.  Whilst voice communications form an integral part of the 
aircraft pilot’s task, increases in the volume of air traffic and pressure on turnaround 
times at airports have shown that voice channels can become a limiting factor in safe 
and efficient aircraft operations.  Digital communications technology is increasingly 
used to provide aircraft crews with information necessary to carry out flight plans and 
aircraft operations, transmitting data through visual and auditory displays, and thus 
utilising an additional human information channel. 
When Young and Jenkinson (2003) asked a group of potential users (i.e., train 
drivers and signallers) for their opinions as to the introduction of GSM-R, many 
responded in a favourable manner.  The enhanced functionality, and the possibility for 
hand-held radios to be used outside the cab were seen as particularly positive elements.  
At the same time, though, most users noted the importance of equipment design and 
training for the successful adoption of the new system.  Young and Jenkinson (2003) 
concluded their study with recommendations for usability, integration, and cab fitment 
issues associated with GSM-R. 
The rail industry is somewhat unique in not legislating against radio use.  However, 
data so far do not implicate radios as a cause of accidents.  Having said that, the 
standard on train radio systems (RSSB, 2003) does caution about the use of radios on 
the move, due to concerns about visual distraction.  Enhanced functionality, such as text 
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or fax messaging, is tempered by certain conditions, and train operators are required to 
train their drivers in the risks of using radios while moving.  In this respect, train radios 
are becoming more closely analogous to using mobile phones in cars, due to the 
primacy of visual input, rather than aircraft cockpit communications where visual 
lookout is perhaps of diminished importance.  The input to the standard reflects this, 
drawing more heavily on the relevant literature in car- and truck-driving, where mobile 
phone use is a hotly debated issue (e.g., Haigney and Westerman, 2001).  Additional 
recommendations about the consistency and integration of interface design in the cab 
have also been raised in the standard as points for consideration. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The introduction of ERTMS onto the UK rail network brings with it a plethora of 
human factors concerns and challenges, many of which have already been faced in the 
aviation and automotive industries.  Indeed, the myriad overlaps between these domains 
provide a substantial platform on which to build railway-specific research.  The train 
protection systems designed to ensure separation are similar in concept to Automatic 
Intelligent Cruise Control in cars (particularly at Level 3 ERTMS, with ‘moving block’ 
separation) or Traffic Collision and Alert Systems in aircraft.  The reliance upon in-cab 
displays is analogous to glass cockpits, and is also emerging in cars.  Signallers, 
communications, and the signalling system reflect their counterparts in Air Traffic 
Management.  Finally, the overall driving task shares many visual demands as that for 
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car drivers, although the reliance on head-up (i.e., external) information is perhaps not 
quite so crucial in a task with no steering demands. 
While this paper has divided up the issues according to different applied areas of 
research, in actual fact the central themes of mental workload, situation awareness, and 
trust in automation are relevant throughout – and indeed interact with each other (cf. 
Stanton and Young, 2000a).  Problems of transition and migration are equally 
applicable to GSM-R alone as they are to ERTMS in general.  Moreover, the entire 
human-machine system is liable to fail if the technology is not handled in an integrated 
and holistic manner. 
Fortunately, the UK rail industry is taking the issues of human factors in ERTMS 
very seriously, and is devoting a considerable amount of resources towards addressing 
them.  The research areas presented in this paper are already being studied by the 
industry, with further projects on the signaller’s interface and cab ergonomics are also 
planned, and the output from all of these studies is being fed directly into the 
development programme.  This has presented an ideal opportunity for the human factors 
specialists involved to provide input at an early stage in the design process – which is 
the optimal time for making a real difference to the resulting system.  Ironically, this has 
presented even more problems for the experimenters to cope with – such as how to 
develop a scenario around a system that has not yet even been defined.  Nonetheless, the 
human factors issues discussed in this paper represent lessons learned from other 
transport industries with similar technologies.  Despite (or perhaps because of) the rail 
industry following its transport counterparts with such technology, there may also be 
further lessons that can be transferred back out to these other domains. 
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Ultimately, the design philosophy behind ERTMS reflects an example of good 
human factors practice when implementing advanced technology in any system.  There 
is very little attempt to replace the driver or take over any driving tasks (with the 
exception of the redundant safety systems); ERTMS rather supports and enhances the 
activities that the driver already undertakes.  Such an approach helps to avoid many of 
the problems of automation discussed in this paper, thus keeping the driver in the 
control loop (cf. Endsley and Kiris, 1995).  The devil truly lies in the detail, though, and 
we should not become complacent in maintaining the human factors effort across these 
research streams.  An intelligent in-cab system is all very well, but if it is not 
implemented appropriately, train drivers might just end up as computer operators.  In 
that case, as has been observed in aviation, they may best advised to switch it off and 
look out of the window. 
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